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Abstract
Signiﬁcant advances have beenmade in thebehavioral assessment and clinical
management of disorders of consciousness (DOC). In addition, functional
neuroimaging paradigms are now available to help assess consciousness levels
in this challenging patient population. The success of these neuroimaging
approaches as diagnostic markers is, however, intrinsically linked to un-
derstanding the relationships between consciousness and the brain. In this
context, a combined theoretical approach to neuroimaging studies is needed.
The promise of such theoretically basedmarkers is illustrated by recent ﬁnd-
ings that used a perturbational approach to assess the levels of consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
Clinical and neuroimaging studies have made signiﬁcant progress in the differential diagnosis,
treatment, and ethical management of patients in a coma, in a vegetative state/unresponsive wake-
fulness syndrome (VS/UWS), and in a minimally conscious state (MCS) (Giacino et al. 2014). In
this review, we discuss the state of the science for clinical assessment of disorders of consciousness
(DOC) and the potential use of neuroimaging to diagnose consciousness.
Following severe damage to the brain, caused by trauma, stroke, or anoxia, patients can
fall into a coma. Coma is a transient state characterized by a complete absence of wakefulness
and awareness (Plum & Posner 1983). The recovery of wakefulness without signs of awareness
heralds a transition to VS/UWS (Laureys et al. 2010, Multi-Society Task Force on PVS 1994a).
In contrast, patients in MCS show reproducible nonreﬂexive behaviors but remain unable to
communicate (Giacino et al. 2002). The MCS entity has been divided into MCS+ and MCS−,
depending on the complexity of behavioral responses (i.e., presence or absence of language
functions, respectively) (Bruno et al. 2012). Emergence of MCS (EMCS) occurs when patients
regain accurate communication and/or functional use of objects. Finally, locked-in syndrome
(LIS) patients can be misdiagnosed as DOC despite preserved awareness because of a complete
paralysis of voluntary muscles, except vertical eye movements (Bauer et al. 1979). Table 1
summarizes diagnostic criteria for DOC and related states.
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The clinical assessment of the level of consciousness is based primarily on observation of sponta-
neous and stimulus-evoked behaviors. Arousal is measured by eye-opening, whereas awareness is
assessed by patient’s command-following or the assessor’s search for other nonreﬂexive behaviors.
Misdiagnosis of unawareness is very frequent (up to 40%) when diagnosis is based solely on clinical
consensus, without use of appropriate behavioral scales (Schnakers et al. 2009). Themost sensitive
scale to differentiate MCS from VS/UWS is, to date, the revised version of the Coma Recovery
Scale (CRS-R) (Giacino et al. 2004, Seel et al. 2010). In the intensive care unit, a routine use of
the Full Outline of Unresponsiveness scale, which is faster to administer, is also recommended







































































NE37CH23-Laureys ARI 30 June 2014 9:42
Table 1 Diagnostic criteria for patients with severe acquired brain injuries
Clinical entities DOC Definition
Coma (Plum & Posner 1983) Yes No wakefulness
No awareness of self or environment
Vegetative state/unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome (Laureys et al.
2010, Multi-Society Task Force on
PVS 1994a)
Yes Wakefulness
No awareness of self or environment
No sustained, reproducible, purposeful behavioral responses to external
stimuli
No language comprehension or expression
Relatively preserved hypothalamic and brain stem autonomic functions
Bowel and bladder incontinence
Variably preserved cranial-nerve and spinal reﬂexes
Minimally conscious state (Bruno
et al. 2011b, Giacino et al. 2002)
Yes Wakefulness
Fluctuating awareness with reproducible, purposeful behavioral responses to
external stimuli
Minimally conscious state minus Yes Visual pursuit
Reaching for objects
Orientation to noxious stimulation
Contingent behavior
Minimally conscious state plus Yes Following commands
Intentional communication
Intelligible verbalization
Emergence from minimally conscious










Presence of communication through the eyes
Preserved cognitive abilities
DOC, disorders of consciousness.
Locked-in syndrome
(LIS): patients who
are aroused and aware
but who cannot move














(Wijdicks et al. 2005). Speciﬁc assessment material should also be employed to increase sensitivity
(see sidebar, Clinical Assessment). On the patient side, some factors potentially causing decreased
responsiveness should be noted:motor impairment, aphasia, agnosia, blindness or deafness, ﬂuctu-
ation of vigilance, and the presence of pain (Schnakers 2012).Othermedical complications (e.g., in-
fections) and sedatingmedicationsmay also complicate the assessment ofDOC(Whyte et al. 2013).
These elements should be investigated. The sidebar Clinical Assessment provides our recommen-
dations concerning clinical assessment of DOC. The sidebar Clinical Management describes how
recent advances in clinical diagnosis have affected treatment, prognosis, and ethical issues inDOC.
Even if the border zone between patients in VS/UWS and MCS is, at present, well delimited,
bedside assessment of consciousness is intrinsically gated by behavioral responsiveness. It is now
increasingly more recognized that the absence of observed purposeful behaviors at the bedside
cannot be taken as deﬁnitive proof of the absence of consciousness. If persistent doubts concerning
a patient’s consciousness level exist, neuroimaging techniques such as positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and electroencephalography (EEG)
can be useful to complement behavioral diagnosis.
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ACTIVE NEUROIMAGING PARADIGMS
As previously mentioned, there is a signiﬁcant risk that decreased behavioral responsiveness in
brain-damaged patients may be due at least partially to motor impairment. In this context, neu-
roimaging paradigms that identify nonreﬂexive brain activation patterns in response to commands,
while bypassing motor output, may be helpful. A positive response to these paradigms could, in
principle, be considered reasonable evidence for the presence of consciousness in a given patient.
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT
1. What to know before starting?
• The terminology of DOC (see Table 1)
• The signs of MCS: reproducible responses to command, visual pursuit, automatic motor response (e.g.,
scratching, grabbing objects), adapted emotional behavior, localization to noxious stimulation, intelligible
verbalization, object recognition and localization, nonfunctional communication, resistance to eye-opening
(Giacino et al. 2002, van Ommen et al. 2013)
• The signs of EMCS: functional communication and object use (Giacino et al. 2002)
• Reflex behaviors: auditory startle, blinking to threat, ﬂexion withdrawal/stereotyped to pain, yawning, oral
reﬂexes (Giacino et al. 2002)
• Debated behavior: visual ﬁxation (Bruno et al. 2010), localization to sound (Cheng et al. 2013)
2. What to do before starting?
• Collect patient’s past and currentmedical history: sensory deﬁcits, cause of coma, time since onset, localized
pain, sedative medication
• Always consider the patient conscious even if apparently unresponsive. Explain the aim of the exam and the
need for full collaboration
• Place the patient in sitting position
• All limbs must be visible
• Ensure enough light and quiet environment with a period of rest before starting
• Apply arousal protocol if needed (Giacino et al. 2004)
• Perform a few minutes of observation of spontaneous behavior
3. What to do during the assessment?
• Assess all modalities: audition, vision, motricity/tactile stimulation, oromotor behavior, communication,
arousal
• Use the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised
• Use specific tools:mirror for visual pursuit (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2008), own name for auditory localization
(Cheng et al. 2013), oral and written commands, colorful objects, meaningful/emotional stimuli
• Way to assess: assess the most reactive part of the body (from medical history, spontaneous behavior),
ask several command-following questions based on spontaneous behaviors, use ﬁnger for blinking to threat,
evaluate visual pursuit in horizontal and vertical planes
• Give encouragement to the patient
• If signs of fatigue: break and/or arousal protocol
4. Other recommendations
• Repeat assessments combining morning and afternoon evaluations, minimum 5 times total for a ﬁnal
diagnosis
• Extended evaluation time (20–60 min) needed
• Qualified and trained assessor
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CLINICAL MANAGEMENT
Advances in the understanding of brain function in noncommunicative severely brain-damaged patients go hand
in hand within their clinical management. There is currently no standard of care to guide clinical management of
patients with DOC. Once signs of consciousness are detected at the bedside (Seel et al. 2010) or via neuroimaging
(Stender et al. 2014), the next step is to ﬁnd a way for these patients to communicate. Standardized protocols search-
ing for reliable responses to commands can be used to develop a binary code (Whyte et al. 1999). Communication-
enabling brain computer interfaces can also be used via active paradigms in EEG and fMRI (Chatelle et al. 2012a,
Lule´ et al. 2013), or even by measuring changes in pupil size (Stoll et al. 2013).
Pharmacological treatments such as amantadine (Giacino et al. 2012) and zolpidem (Thonnard et al. 2014,
Whyte et al. 2014) should be systematically tried in DOC patients because they can potentially improve patients’
levels of awareness (Gosseries et al. 2013). Amantadine has been correlated with an increased metabolism in the
frontoparietal network in an MCS patient (Schnakers et al. 2008a), whereas Zolpidem decreased low-frequency
EEG activity in several patients with DOC (Williams et al. 2013). If signs of discomfort are observed, using for
instance theNociceptionComa Scale-Revised (Chatelle et al. 2012b), painmedication should be given (Schnakers&
Zasler 2007). This scale has been shown to selectively capture residual activity in pain matrix regions (e.g., anterior
cingulated cortex) in severely brain-damaged patients (Chatelle et al. 2014). In some cases, trials of therapeutic
interventions including invasive thalamic brain stimulation (Schiff et al. 2007), spinal cord stimulation (Yamamoto
et al. 2013), and noninvasive transcranial direct current stimulation are indicated (Thibaut et al. 2014).
Patients in MCS have more chance of recovery than do patients in VS/UWS (Luaute´ et al. 2010, Noe´ et al.
2012). Other prognostic factors are the CRS-R total score on admission (i.e., >6) (Estraneo et al. 2013), a young
age (Howell et al. 2013), a traumatic etiology (Multi-Society Task Force on PVS 1994b), an early time since onset
(Whyte et al. 2009), the presence of pupillary light reﬂexes (Fischer et al. 2006), the absence ofmedical complications
(Whyte et al. 2013), and specialized early treatment (Seel et al. 2013). VS/UWS patients who show preserved fMRI
activation of associative cortices also have higher chances to recover (Di et al. 2008, Vogel et al. 2013). Finally, the
presence of long-latency event-related potential components in response to stimuli (Estraneo et al. 2013, Fischer
et al. 2006, Steppacher et al. 2013, Xu et al. 2012) or preserved default mode network (DMN) connectivity (Norton
et al. 2012) are also indicative of a better recovery.
Advances in clinical diagnosis and detection of residual cognitive function in patients with DOC also raise new
ethical questions about withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in this patient population (Ferna´ndez-Espejo&Owen
2013, Kitzinger & Kitzinger 2014). Legal precedence in several countries has established the right of the medical
team to withdraw artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration from patients in VS/UWS, but not those in MCS (Ferreira
2007, Manning 2012). Opinions on these end-of-life decisions vary, however, depending not only on the diagnosis
of the patient, but also on the profession and the cultural background of the clinicians (Demertzi et al. 2011).
Moreover, caregivers who consider that VS/UWS patients likely feel pain are more often opposed to withdrawal of
life-sustaining therapy (Demertzi et al. 2009, 2013). Another ethical concern is the quality of life in chronic DOC
patients. This question is difﬁcult to address in the absence of communication with the patient. In this context, it is








To be able to draw such strong inferences, however, these active paradigms must select only
positive responses in nonreﬂexive brain activation patterns following task instruction. Indeed, if a
reﬂex, involuntary brain activation led to a positive response in these paradigms, they would lose
their value as a diagnostic tool for willful response to command and, hence, for the presence of
consciousness in noncommunicative brain-damaged patients. Thus, validation studies should be
performed to ensure that the passive listening of the instruction to perform a task cannot elicit
a brain activity pattern similar to the one from a voluntary response. The most effective control





























































































requires the subject to
perform a speciﬁc task
on request
would be to ask subjects to listen to the task instruction while being told beforehand not to per-
form the task. Ideally, two different commands should also be tested and different reproducible
responses should be obtained for each.
An appropriately controlled diagnostic test is the tennis imagery paradigm (Boly et al. 2007,
Monti et al. 2010, Owen et al. 2006) and its variants (Bardin et al. 2011). In this fMRI paradigm,
patients are instructed to repetitively alternate 30 s of motor imagery (i.e., playing tennis) or
spatial navigation mental imagery (i.e., walking in your house) with 30 s of rest. To obtain a
brain response to command, fMRI data are analyzed by detecting task-speciﬁc motor or spatial
navigation neural activation during the periods in which the patient was instructed to perform the
task, as compared with periods of rest. The 30-s imagery task duration ensures that the response
assessed is not simply due to passive processing of verbal instruction. Validation studies have also
been performed to verify that no activation is seen when an assessor instructs the patient not to
perform the task. Moreover, comparing brain activation patterns in response to the instruction to
imagine spatial navigation assesses speciﬁcity. In another recent properly controlled fMRI task,
investigators used an increase in brain activation during attention to the words “yes” or “no”
presented in a stream of numbers as a patient’s response to a command (Naci & Owen 2013). In a
separate experiment, this task was controlled for the absence of reﬂexive activation and, thus, for
its speciﬁcity to detect only conscious responses (Naci et al. 2013). In addition, the search for a
differential response to attention to “yes” or “no” ensures that brain activity patterns are speciﬁc
to the question asked, which further corroborates the nonreﬂexivity of the response.
Some properly designed EEG paradigms are currently available to clinicians who seek
command-following without motor output in brain-damaged patients. A paradigm designed by
Schnakers et al. (2008c) uses differential EEG responses during attention to names as a response to
command. In this paradigm, sequences of names containing the patient’s own name are presented,
in both passive and active conditions. In the active condition, the patients are instructed to count
her or his own name or to count another target name. The search for a difference between active
and passive conditions as well as between runs with attention to the patient’s own name and runs
with attention to another name offers a control for both the presence of nonreﬂexive responses
and for speciﬁcity. Finally, Cruse et al. (2011) designed an EEG paradigm to detect oscillatory
changes after the instruction to imagine squeezing one’s hand or moving one’s feet. Here again
a control experiment shows no response when the subjects are instructed not to do the task. In
addition, the comparison of the EEG activity differences for the imagery of moving the hand
versus that of moving the foot ensures speciﬁcity.
In all the previously cited active paradigms, a positive response can be considered as a reasonable
surrogate for the presence of consciousness in brain-damaged patients. Thus, these tasks may
be used as additional diagnostic tools in the clinical assessment of consciousness. In fact, these
paradigms have already allowed investigators to identify behaviorally VS/UWS answering to
command using brain activity (Cruse et al. 2011, Monti et al. 2010, Naci & Owen 2013, Owen
et al. 2006) (see alsoFigure 1).Once identiﬁed, these patients are not to be considered unconscious
anymore but should switch to a diagnostic category of functionalMCS (Vogel et al. 2013) orMCS∗
(Gosseries et al. 2014, Stender et al. 2014).
The main limitations of the active paradigm are that negative ﬁndings occur often in DOC
and that they are uninterpretable. Recent cohort studies have indeed shown that only a minority,
about 20%, of DOC patients can positively respond to this approach (Monti et al. 2010, Stender
et al. 2014). Negative results obtained with command-following approaches could be due not to
patient unconsciousness, but to other reasons such as aphasia, apraxia, ﬂuctuating vigilance, or
simply the patient’s unwillingness to collaborate. Thus, negative ﬁndings in the active paradigm
can never exclude the possibility that the patient has retained awareness.

















































































Multimodal diagnosis assessment in disorders of consciousness. Illustrative neuroimaging results in two vegetative state/unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) patients, one minimally conscious state (MCS) patient, and one healthy control showing possible
dissociations between active and passive paradigms and how they usefully complement each other in the evaluation of patients. This
ﬁgure demonstrates, for example, that fMRI mental imagery tasks (motor imagery on the left, navigation imagery on the right) show
positive results in the control subject and in the second VS/UWS patient. PET and fMRI resting-state results typically show a strong
decrease in brain activity and anatomy [here, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI)] in the ﬁrst VS/UWS patient and show partially preserved
brain activity in the second VS/UWS patient as in the MCS patient. Negative responses to active paradigms in MCS patients




where the subject does
not do anything in
particular
Neuroimaging assessment of DOC should encompass not only active paradigm but also gen-
eral measures of brain function (the so-called passive approaches). A global assessment of brain
function is generally useful and can be especially helpful in the presence of negative results in active
paradigms. In the next section, we review potential uses of these passive neuroimaging assessment
studies for consciousness diagnosis in DOC.
NEURAL CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In the past few years, numerous studies identiﬁed distinct patterns of brain activity in VS/UWS as
compared withMCS (Laureys & Schiff 2012). These state-of-the-art studies held to the following
safeguards to ensure an accurate clinical diagnosis as well as an appropriate design to draw infer-
ences about group-level differences in a given population study. First, clinical diagnosis should
be performed using repeated CRS-R testing by trained assessors (Giacino et al. 2004, Seel et al.
2010). Second, a sufﬁcient number of patients should be studied to obtain a representative sam-
ple of each population. It is indeed common that about 20% of patients in VS/UWS present an
atypical brain activity pattern. To increase sensitivity, quantitative statistical group analyses can
also be used. We now review general patterns of brain function demonstrated in recent studies of
VS/UWS and MCS patient populations.
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Default mode
network (DMN):
a network of brain
regions that are active
when the awake
subject is at rest
Spontaneous Brain Activity
There are three commonways tomeasure spontaneous regional brain activity using neuroimaging.
PET measures regional brain metabolism, whereas fMRI and EEG quantify oscillations at the
second and millisecond scales, respectively. Early PET studies identiﬁed decreased metabolism
in frontoparietal cortices in VS/UWS patients as compared with controls (Beuthien-Baumann
et al. 2003, Laureys et al. 1999a), resuming to normal after recovery of consciousness (Laureys
et al. 1999b). In MCS patients, lateral frontoparietal area metabolism is preserved (Figure 2a)
(Thibaut et al. 2012). In addition, MCS+ patients show preserved metabolism in language and
sensorimotor areas (Bruno et al. 2012).
EEG studies reported higher delta power in VS/UWS (Lehembre et al. 2012) and more fre-
quent high delta power microstates in VS/UWS as compared with MCS patients (Figure 2c)
(Fingelkurts et al. 2012b). These results are in line with other studies that show lower bispectral
index values (Schnakers et al. 2008b) and decreased spectral entropy in VS/UWS (Gosseries et al.
2011). Moreover, in contrast with MCS, VS/UWS patients do not present with preserved EEG
sleep-wake patterns (Landsness et al. 2011). Finally, the amplitude of low-frequency ﬂuctuations
of resting-state fMRI signals in the precuneus is higher in MCS as compared with VS/UWS
(Figure 2b) (Huang et al. 2013).
Response to Stimuli
For regional spontaneous activity, brain reactivity to sensory stimuli can be evaluated with PET,
fMRI, or EEG. PET studies suggest that VS/UWSpatients typically activate only primary sensory
cortices in response to noxious or auditory stimuli (Laureys et al. 2000a, 2002). In contrast, MCS
patients show preserved higher-order areas of activation, encompassing the frontoparietal cortices
(Figure 2d ) (Boly et al. 2005, 2004). Likewise, most VS/UWS patients display fMRI activation
of only low-level cortices in response to sensory stimuli (Coleman et al. 2009, Di et al. 2007).
In contrast, MCS patients typically recruit a more widespread set of associative sensory cortices.
Default mode network (DMN) activation in response to self-referential stimuli is also stronger
in MCS as compared with VS/UWS patients (Figure 2e) (Huang et al. 2013, Qin et al. 2010).
Finally, DMN deactivation is also preserved in MCS patients but is virtually absent in VS/UWS
patients (Crone et al. 2011).
The mismatch negativity (MMN), an early negative waveform elicited by a deviant tone in a
repetitive series, has been one of the most widely studied EEG components in patients with DOC.
MMN, as with other long latency components, is found more often in individual MCS patients
than in VS/UWS patients (Fischer et al. 2010, Ho¨ller et al. 2011, Qin et al. 2008). Another long-
latency positive component, the P3, is also found more consistently in MCS (Bekinschtein et al.
2009, Faugeras et al. 2012), although it can be detected in some VS/UWS patients (Perrin et al.
2006). Likewise, statistical group analyses suggested that MMN and P3 amplitude are higher in
MCS (Boly et al. 2011, Faugeras et al. 2012). The higher amplitude of long latency components
in MCS patients as compared with VS/UWS patients could be linked to preserved function in
cerebral backward connections (Figure 2f ) (Boly et al. 2011).
Functional Connectivity
Functional connectivity studies assess how different brain areas interact with each other.
These studies have been performed with numerous conditions in healthy subjects and patient
populations. They have now been successfully applied in several ways to differentiate MCS
patients from VS/UWS patient populations. These studies assume that if brain areas causally
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interact, the time course of their activity should be correlated. This claim usually but not
always rests on the assumption of direct anatomical connectivity between the regions studied
(Greicius et al. 2009). PET functional connectivity studies assess the correlation in metabolic
activity between different brain areas during rest or during sensory stimulation. These studies
revealed impaired frontoparietal cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical connectivity in VS/UWS
patients as compared with healthy volunteers (Laureys et al. 1999a, 2000b). As compared with
VS/UWS patients, MCS patients show preserved PET functional connectivity in frontoparietal
cortices (Figure 2g) (Boly et al. 2004). Functional MRI resting-state connectivity studies assess
correlations in blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal magnitude among brain regions
over the course of a single task-free acquisition session. These resting-state fMRI studies
identiﬁed preserved connectivity in both lateral and medial frontoparietal areas in MCS patients
as compared with VS/UWS patients (Figure 2h) (Huang et al. 2013; Kotchoubey et al. 2013;
Ovadia-Caro et al. 2012; Soddu et al. 2011a,b; Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2010). Finally, EEG
functional connectivity studies assess similarities in signal amplitude or oscillatory phase (in
given frequency bands) between scalp electrodes or between brain regions if performed in source
space. Coherence and cross-approximate entropy EEG studies conﬁrmed stronger frontoparietal
connectivity in MCS patients as compared with VS/UWS patients (Figure 2i) (Lehembre et al.
2012, Wu et al. 2011). The organization of oscillatory brain connectivity in interacting modules
is also preserved in MCS patients as compared with VS/UWS patients (Fingelkurts et al. 2013),
especially in the DMN (Fingelkurts et al. 2012a). Overall, functional connectivity studies suggest
a link between preserved cerebral functional interactions and higher consciousness level (e.g.,
arousal and/or cognitive functions) in MCS patients as compared with VS/UWS patients.
Individual Results Analysis
As illustrated above, virtually any available neuroimaging technique can reveal different group
patterns of brain function in VS/UWS and MCS patients. Even if group separation is clear,
at the individual level outliers exist. The interpretation of outliers can be problematic. Com-
bining different techniques may be helpful to better document a patient’s general brain func-
tion (see Figure 1); however, even multimodal assessments may not provide an ultimate
solution.
Let us consider this concept in more detail using an example. Suppose we use PET to assess
10 patients unambiguously diagnosed at the bedside as VS/UWS. In our experience, out of these
10 patients, 7 will show a classical frontoparietal hypometabolic PET pattern, and 3 will have
preserved metabolism of PET. Among the 3 latter patients, typically only 1 will show a positive
response to fMRIorEEGactive paradigms.Twoout of these 3will not.What dowedo then?What
canwe infer if the patient does not respond to the active paradigmbut has a relatively normal PET?
Is high PET metabolism always a deﬁnitive marker of the presence of consciousness? If a given
neuroimaging measure was a deﬁnitive marker of consciousness, it should be consistent in other
states of unconsciousness, such as sleep, anesthesia, or seizures. And we know that during epileptic
seizures, PETmetabolism can be normal, or even increased, even though subjects are unconscious
(Engel et al. 1982). Preserved brain metabolism at PET is thus not necessarily deﬁnitive proof of
the presence of consciousness.Table 2 illustrates that, to date, none of the classical neuroimaging
techniquesmentioned above are sufﬁcient to diagnose consciousness. To identify a deﬁnitive brain
signature of consciousness, developing a theoretical framework to deﬁne the mechanisms that
link consciousness and the brain is a necessary step (see sidebar, On the Nature of Consciousness,
and Figure 3). We describe the concrete application of such a theoretical framework to the
neuroimaging-based diagnosis of consciousness in the next section.
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Table 2 Comparison of neuroimaging findings in different states of unconsciousness
Techniques
VS/UWS >
MCS Alike in other states Different in other states
PET metabolism Decrease (FP) Propofol anesthesia (Fiset et al. 1999),
sleep (Braun et al. 1997, Maquet et al.
1990)
Epilepsy (Engel et al. 1982), K complex









Increase Sleep (Mascetti et al. 2011) Epilepsy (Blumenfeld 2005)
PET: response to
stimuli





Decrease Propofol anesthesia (Gosseries et al. 2012,
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2012)
K complex (Dang-Vu et al. 2011)
EEG: response to
stimuli




Decrease (FP) Isoﬂurane, halothane anesthesia




Decrease (FP) Propofol (Boveroux et al. 2010),
sevoﬂurane anesthesia (Martuzzi et al.
2011)




Decrease Propofol, sevoﬂurane, ketamine
anesthesia (Boly et al. 2012a, Lee et al.
2013)
Sleep (Langheim et al. 2011), propofol
anesthesia (Barrett et al. 2012, Murphy
et al. 2011)
Abbreviations: ALFF, amplitude of low-frequency ﬂuctuations; EEG, electroencephalography; fMRI, functional magnetic resonsance imaging;




Brain island. See sidebar, On the Nature of Consciousness, for references.
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ON THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
To develop amechanistic account of the relationship between consciousness and the brain, forging a comprehensive
theory of consciousness is a necessary step. Developing a theory of consciousness is not only useful at a conceptual
level, but would also have direct practical implications for assessing patients with DOC. A thoroughly validated
theory of consciousness is ultimately the only way to make strong inferences about the presence or absence of
consciousness in unresponsive brain-damaged patients where all the other approaches fail.
Let us consider a hypothetical example of an unresponsive brain-damaged patient, whose PET scan shows
an island of preserved activity in the right posterior parietal cortex (Figure 3). The patient shows only reﬂexive
spontaneous behavior, no behavioral response to command, and no ability to communicate. He also does not follow
commands on active paradigms. Moreover, afferent pathways are damaged, impairing the recruitment of cortical
areas in response to sensory stimulation. Strikingly, however, brain anatomy, resting metabolism, and fast EEG
activity are well preserved in the right posterior parietal cortex.
What can we infer about the presence or absence of consciousness in such a patient? Is anybody home? Is the
presence of a well-functioning parietal cortex alone enough for some amount of consciousness (even though, of
course, it would be lacking some attributes)? And if so, what could we infer about the contents of consciousness?
Would there be any visual, auditory, or verbal content? Would he feel any pain? Would he have any degree of self-
awareness? Answering such questions exclusively on the basis of empirical data would clearly not be possible because
one cannot directly ask an isolated parietal cortex if it is conscious. Instead, one needs a theory of consciousness that
starts from the fundamental features of consciousness itself, provides general principles concerning the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for consciousness, leads tomeasures of consciousness that are generally applicable, and provides
some guidance about how the quality of experience is determined by the neuroanatomical and neurophysiological

















FROM EXPLORATORY TO EXPLANATORY NEURAL
CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In the past two decades, several neuroscientiﬁc theories hypothesized about the relationships
between the brain and consciousness (Block 2011, Dehaene &Changeux 2011, Lamme 2006, Lau
& Rosenthal 2011, Tononi 2008, Tononi & Edelman 1998). Such theories can help identify brain
markers of the presence or absence of consciousness using neuroimaging. We illustrate this point
using the integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) (Tononi 2012).
IITC states that consciousness is related to a system’s capacity for information integration
(Tononi 2008, 2012). In the case of the brain, the theory predicts that consciousness-supporting
networks should present an optimal balance between functional integration and differentiation
(Boly et al. 2009). This hypothesis has recently been tested using transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) coupled with high-density EEG. This technique allows investigators to directly
measure effective connectivity responses (i.e., TMS-induced causal interactions between distant
brain areas) with EEG (Massimini et al. 2009). Our group, in collaboration with Massimini (from
the University of Milan) and Tononi (from the University of Wisconsin-Madison), has applied
TMS-EEG to assess brain function during sleep, under anesthesia, and in brain-damaged patients.
Results of these studies show clear-cut differences in TMS-EEG responses between conscious and
unconscious subjects in all conditions. During non–rapid eye movement sleep (NREM), under
general anesthesia (e.g., midazolam), and in VS/UWS patients, TMS typically triggers a stereo-
typical slow wave that stays local, which indicates a breakdown of effective connectivity (Ferrarelli
et al. 2010, Massimini et al. 2005, Rosanova et al. 2012). In contrast, during normal wakefulness,
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Figure 4
TMS-EEG responses during recovery from coma. TMS-EEG measurements in a patient evolving from
vegetative/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS, black arrow) to a minimally conscious state (MCS,
blue arrow), then to emergence of MCS (EMCS, red arrow). The ﬁgure illustrates both the spreading and
time courses of cortical currents evoked by TMS when stimulating parietal (top) and frontal (bottom) cortices
(white crosses). In VS/UWS patients, the response stays local and stereotyped and becomes widespread and
differentiated in MCS and EMCS patients. Other abbreviations: CRS-R, Coma Recovery Scale-Revised;




in MCS, EMCS, and LIS patients, or during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, brain activation
patterns to TMS are always complex, i.e., widespread and differentiated (Figure 4) (Massimini
et al. 2005, 2010; Rosanova et al. 2012).
We recently designed a new empirical measure known as the perturbational complexity in-
dex (PCI) to quantify in one number the difference in TMS-EEG responses present between
states of consciousness and states of unconsciousness (Casali et al. 2013). PCI estimates both
the information content and the integration of brain activations through the computation of the
normalized Lempel-Ziv complexity (Lempel & Ziv 1976) of the signiﬁcant EEG spatiotemporal
responses to TMS. According to our current results, PCI is remarkably reliable to differentiate
consciousness from unconsciousness within and across subjects and conditions: It is always high
(i.e., above 0.31) in healthy awake subjects, in MCS, EMCS and LIS patients, as well as during
REM sleep, but is invariably low (i.e., below 0.31) during NREM sleep, in patients in VS/UWS
and under anesthesia-induced unconsciousness (using midazolam, propofol, or xenon) (Figure 5).
PCI also allows a clear-cut differentiation between patients in VS/UWS and those who recovered
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Figure 5
Perturbational complexity index (PCI) as a marker of consciousness. (a) PCI in wakefulness, sleep, and anesthesia. PCI calculated
during wakefulness ranges between 0.44 and 0.67, whereas PCI calculated during unconsciousness [i.e., non-rapid eye movement
(NREM) sleep and midazolam, xenon, or propofol anesthesia] ranges between 0.12 and 0.31. The histograms display the distributions
of PCI across subjects during conscious (dark gray bars) and unconscious (light gray bars) conditions. (b) PCI in severe brain damage.
PCI follows the level of consciousness assessed with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R). It progressively increases from
vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) to minimally conscious state (MCS) and emergence of the MCS
(EMCS). VS/UWS values are in the same range as those observed during NREM sleep and general anesthesia. PCI for EMCS and
locked-in (LIS) patients are in the same range as healthy awake subjects. Patients in MCS show intermediate PCI values but never
below the threshold of unconsciousness (gray dashed line, PCI = 0.31). Other abbreviation: TMS, transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Figure adapted from Casali et al. (2013).
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consciousness (i.e., MCS, EMCS and LIS) at the single-subject level. Further studies on larger
samples should conﬁrm these inaugural results. In sum, the highly promising aspect of this theo-
retically based index of consciousness levels motivates interest in a theoretical framework to help
design clinically applicable diagnostic tools for consciousness.
CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: WHAT IS IT
LIKE TO BE IN AN MCS?
Previous sections discuss progress concerning the diagnosis of the level of consciousness in DOC.
However, another outstanding question remains essentially unaddressed: What is the content of
consciousness inMCSor in behaviorallyVS/UWSpatients reclassiﬁed byneuroimaging asMCS∗?
What is it like to be in an MCS? Contents of consciousness are usually assessed by obtaining
subjects’ reports. InMCS patients, no report can be obtained because no accurate communication
is possible. Generalizing neural correlates of conscious content observed in healthy volunteers to
interpret MCS brain ﬁndings is also problematic because of the presence of the brain lesions and
the possible ensuing reorganization. Studies of cognition in MCS using EEG and fMRI active
paradigms could help address this question, at least in part. Making inferences about the content
of consciousness in noncommunicative patients is a question that can only be addressed fully
if empirical studies are complemented by a general theoretical framework (see sidebar, On the
Nature of Consciousness, above).
CONCLUSIONS
Recent years witnessed numerous advances in the diagnosis and understanding of brain function
in DOC. Research combining clinical, neuroimaging, and theoretical approaches will likely lead
to continued fruitful advances in the diagnosis and treatment of these patients.
We offer a few take-home messages:
1. Consciousness is tricky to diagnose clinically; consider the patient as conscious until all
evidence is collected.
2. Active paradigms, when properly designed, can successfully probe evidence of the presence
of consciousness in unresponsive patients; caution in interpreting negative results is needed,
however.
3. Neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have identiﬁed consistent group differences
in brain activity patterns in MCS patients as compared with VS/UWS patients. Single-
subject level interpretation of these results is nevertheless often limited.
4. Theoretically based neuroimaging approaches (such as PCI) are highly promising to identify
reliable single-subject level markers of consciousness. Larger population studies of PCI as a
consciousness meter are ongoing.
5. More research on the contents of consciousness in DOC patients is needed.
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